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Uncertainty and Monetary Policy Rules in the United States  
 
“Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it 
is the defining characteristic of that landscape” (Greenspan, 2003).  
 
1) Introduction 
Uncertainty is a central issue in monetary policy, as the quote from Alan 
Greenspan above illustrates.    Empirical models, however, rarely take account of 
this, effectively assuming that policymakers ignore uncertainty.  The evident 
focus of policymakers on uncertainty suggests that this assumption is invalid and 
therefore that empirical models of monetary policy must account for uncertainty.  
This paper considers the effects of uncertainty about the true state of the 
economy on monetary policy, estimating a monetary policy rule that allows for 
this.   
Our empirical model draws on the theoretical literature on optimal 
monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the true state of the economy, 
most prominently Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004) and Swanson (2004).   
In existing models of monetary policy under certainty, monetary policy affects 
inflation and the output gap directly, so it is optimal for policymakers to use these 
variables in forming monetary policy.  This is the basis for the Taylor rule (Taylor, 
1993) model of monetary policy and its’ subsequent refinements (eg Woodford, 
2003).  The literature on monetary policy under uncertainty assumes instead that 
monetary policy affects the state of the economy, which in turn affects inflation 
and the output gap.  It is then optimal for monetary policy to respond to the state 
of the economy.  However, it is assumed that the state of the economy is 
 3
unobserved and that policymakers must infer this from observations of inflation 
and the output gap.  Optimal monetary policy is a certainty equivalent function of 
the expected state of the economy.  The expected state of the economy is in turn 
a linear function of inflation and the output gap, whose parameters are functions 
of the variances of these variables.  
The resultant optimal monetary policy rule resembles the familiar Taylor 
rule (Taylor, 1993), but where the coefficients are functions of the variances of 
inflation and the output gap. These apparent departures from certainty 
equivalence arise because of the role of inflation and the output gap as indicator 
variables for monetary policy.  An increase in, for example, the variance of 
inflation reduces the parameter on inflation and increases the parameter on the 
output gap in the equation for the expected state of the economy.  This leads to a 
smaller weight on inflation and a larger weight on the output gap in the monetary 
policy rule.  Similarly, an increase in the variance of the output gap reduces the 
weight on the output gap and increases the weight on inflation in the equation for 
the expected state of the economy, resulting in a lower weight on the output gap 
and a corresponding larger weight on inflation.  As a result, the model makes two 
main testable predictions. First, policymakers should respond less vigorously to 
variables that are more uncertain, so the weight on inflation in the policy rule 
should be lower when inflation is more uncertain and similarly for the output gap 
(cf Peersman and Smets, 1999, Rudebusch, 2001, Soderstrom, 2002, Smets, 
2002, Srour, 2003, Walsh, 2004 and Swanson, 2004). Second, uncertainty about 
one variable may strengthen the response to the other variable, so the weight on 
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the output gap may be larger when inflation is less certain, and vice versa (cf 
Peersman and Smets, 1999, and Swanson, 2004).   
We estimate a system of equations, comprising a monetary policy rule 
whose parameters are functions of the variances of inflation and the output gap 
and equations for inflation and the output gap whose error terms have GARCH 
processes, from which these variances are derived.  We use data since 1983 
since this is when the Fed switched to using the interest rate as the tool of 
monetary policy and since continuity in monetary policy objectives has allowed 
stable policy rules to be estimated over this period (eg Judd and Rudebusch, 
1998).  We find that the behaviour of monetary policymakers is consistent with 
the predictions of the theoretical literature. Monetary policy responds less to 
inflation and the output gap when these variables are more uncertain.  We also 
find that the response to inflation is stronger when the output gap is more 
uncertain, and vice versa.   We quantify the impact of uncertainty by constructing 
a measure of the counterfactual interest rate, which would have been observed if 
there had been no uncertainty. We find that the impact of uncertainty was most 
marked in 1983, when uncertainty increased interest rates by up to 140 basis 
points, 1989-90, when uncertainty increased interest rates by up to 50 basis 
points and in 1996-2001 when uncertainty reduced interest rates by up to 50 
basis points over five years.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 explains 
our methodology.  Section 3 presents our estimates.  Section 4 summarizes our 
findings and offers some conclusions. 
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2) Methodology 
Our empirical model is based on theoretical contributions by Svensson and 
Woodford (2003, 2004) and Swanson (2004).   We consider the model  
 
(1)   1t t t j tyππ π θ υ− −= + +  
 
(2)  1( )t t t ty X L yβ γ η−= + +  
 
(3)  0t t k tX rα α ε−= − +  
 
(4)  ** ( )t t t t p yt t t qi i E E yπρ π π ρ+ += + − +  
 
where π  is the inflation rate, *π  is the inflation target (or desired rate of inflation), 
y is the output gap, X is the state of the economy (e.g. an index of inflationary 
pressures or an index of excess demand)1, i is the nominal interest rate, i* is the 
equilibrium nominal interest rate, r is the real interest rate (defined as 
1t t t tr i E π += − ) and L is the lag operator.  The integers j, k, p and q can be 
positive, negative or zero, so that the relationships in equations (1)-(4) can be 
backward-looking, forward–looking or contemporaneous.   
This model is similar to that considered by Swanson (2004) and 
comparable to that of Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004).  Equation (1) is a 
                                                 
1 Although we treat X as a scalar for simplicity, in general it may have many elements; see 
Swanson (2004). 
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Phillips curve in which inflation at time t is affected by lagged inflation and by the 
output gap at time (t−j). Equation (2) is an aggregate demand equation in which 
the output gap is affected by the state of the economy.  Equation (3) describes 
how the state of the economy at time t is affected by the real interest rate at time 
(t−k).  Finally, equation (4) is a policy rule in which interest rates respond to the 
expected gap between inflation and the target p periods ahead and to the 
expected output gap q periods ahead.   We model uncertainty about inflation and 
the output gap by assuming that the error terms in their respective equations 
follow GARCH(1,1) processes.  Specifically, tυ  is a shock to inflation, assumed 
to be distributed as 2(0, )tN πσ , where 2 2 20 1 1 2 1t t tπ πσ ω ωυ ω σ− −= + +  and 0ω , 1ω  and 2ω  
are parameters.  η  is a shock to the output gap, assumed to be distributed as 
2(0, )tN ησ , where 2 2 20 1 1 2 1t t tη ησ λ λη λ σ− −= + +   and 0λ , 1λ  and 2λ  are parameters.  ε  is 
a shock to the state of the economy, assumed to be distributed as 2(0, )N εσ .  We 
use the implied variances of υ  and η  to measure uncertainty about inflation and 
the output gap respectively (for a similar approach, see Grier and Perry, 2000).  
Policymakers are assumed to know all parameters of the model and the history 
of all variables save for the state of the economy, which is always unknown.    
Swanson (2004) considers a model with simultaneous macroeconomic 
relationships (similar to equations (1)-(3) when 0j k= = ).  Assuming 
policymakers have quadratic preferences, he establishes that a policy rule similar 
to (4) is optimal when 1p q= = − ; he also shows that tπρ  is decreasing and ytρ  is 
increasing in 2tπσ , the variance of the inflation equation, while tπρ  is increasing 
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and ytρ  is decreasing in 2tησ , the variance of the output gap equation.  The policy 
rule does not satisfy the certainty-equivalence principle since the weights on the 
monetary policy rule are functions of the variances of the output gap and inflation 
equations.  If known, the optimal monetary policy rule would be a simple function 
of the state of the economy that satisfies certainty equivalence.  Since it is not, 
policymakers use observations of inflation and the output gap as indicator 
variables, in effect predicting the state of the economy using a linear function of 
inflation and the output gap, whose coefficients are functions of the variances of 
equations (1) and (2).  Changes in these variances therefore change the 
parameters of the monetary policy rule in (4), breaking certainty equivalence.  
Extending Swanson’s results to cases with forward-looking variables is difficult2 
and we cannot as yet make claims about the optimality properties of (4) in the 
forward-looking case (although Svensson and Woodford, 2003, 2004, have made 
some progress on this)3.  Nonetheless we conjecture that Swanson’s argument 
can be extended to the forward-looking case and will use the policy rule in (4) as 
the basis of our empirical model4. 
                                                 
2 Svensson and Woodford (2003, pp 692-693) note that in this case “the problem …is inherently 
more complicated” because “forward-looking variables..depend..on..expectations of future 
endogenous variables and of current and future policy actions. However these expectations in 
turn depend on an estimate of the current state of the economy, and that estimate depends, to 
some extent, on observations of the current forward-looking variables.  This circularity presents a 
considerable challenge”. 
3 Svensson and Woodford’s (2003, p 693) finding that in a forward-looking model “when the 
degree of noise in an indicator of potential output is large, the optimal weight on that indicator 
becomes small” is similar to Swanson (2004)’s results. 
4 The policy rule in (4) has parallels with Brainard’s (1967) model of uncertainty about the 
parameters of macroeconomic relationships.  In that case, the optimal monetary policy rule is 
similar to (4) but where the weights on inflation and the output gap are functions of the variances 
of the uncertain parameters. 
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The policy rule in (4) is a simple extension of the Taylor rule 
representation of monetary policy rules (Taylor, 1993).  Following the influential 
work of Clarida et al (2000), the typical empirical model of monetary policy 
specifies the target for the nominal Federal Funds rate can be written as  
 
(5)  * ( *)t t t p y t t qi i E E yπρ π π ρ+ += + − +  
 
where i~ is the target nominal interest rate, *i is the equilibrium interest rate, 
t t pE π + is the inflation rate that at time t is expected for time (t+p), *π  is the desired 
or target inflation rate, t t qE y +  is the output gap that at time t is expected for time 
(t+q), πρ  is the weight on inflation and yρ  is the weight on output.   The adjustment 
of the actual interest rate towards the target is described by  
 
(6)  titit iiLi
~)1()( 1 ρρ −+= −  
 
where ti
~  is given by (1), 121 ...)(
−ρ++ρ+ρ=ρ niniii LLL  and we can use )1(ii ρ≡ρ  
as a measure of interest rate persistence.   The implied empirical monetary policy 
rule is therefore 
 
(7)  { }0 1( ) (1 )t i t i t t p y t t qi L i E E yπρ ρ ρ ρ π ρ− + += + + − +  
 
where 0 (1 )( * *)i i πρ ρ ρ π= − − .  
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Extending the monetary policy rule in (4) to allow for interest rate 
smoothing, we can write 
 
(8)  { }0 1( ) (1 )t i t i t t t p yt t t qi L i E E yπρ ρ ρ ρ π ρ− + += + + − +  
 
where 22 yt
y
tt σρσρρρ ππππππ ++=  and 22 ytyytyyyt σρσρρρ ππ ++= . If increased 
uncertainty leads to a more passive response to a variable, then 0ππρ <  and 
0yyρ < . If increased uncertainty about one variable strengthens the response to 
other variables, then 0yπρ >  and 0yπρ > .  
 In (2), aggregate demand depends on the unobserved state of the 
economy.  We therefore substitute (3) into (2): 
 
(9)  0 1( )t y y t k t ty r L yθ θ γ ξ− −= − + +  
 
where 0 0yθ α β= , yθ αβ=  and t t tξ βε η= + .  ξ  is a demand shock, assumed to be 
distributed as 2(0, )ytN σ .  Since the variance of ξ  is proportional to that of η , we 
assume that this also evolves as a GARCH(1,1) process, so 
2 2 2
0 1 1 2 1yt t ytσ φ φ ξ φ σ− −= + +  where 0φ , 1φ  and 2φ  are parameters.  We can then use 
the implied variance of ξ  to measure uncertainty about the output gap.  Our 
empirical model comprises equations (1), (8) and (9). 
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Our model allows us to quantify the effects of uncertainty on monetary 
policy.  To do this we can construct the counterfactual interest rate, a measure of 
what the interest rate would have been if there had been no uncertainty, using  
 
(10)  0 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 ){ }
c
t i t i t t p y t t qi L i E E yπρ ρ ρ ρ π ρ− + += + + − +  
 
where 0ρˆ , ˆiρ , ˆπρ  and ˆ yρ  are estimates of the corresponding parameters in (8).   
Equation (10) is simply the fitted value of (8) but where 022 == ytt σσπ  for all t. cti  is 
an estimate of what the interest rate would have been if there had been no 
uncertainty.  We can quantify the effect of uncertainty on monetary policy using 
C
tt ii −ˆ , the gap between the fitted value of the interest rate from estimates of (8) 
and the counterfactual interest rate, where a positive value of this gap indicates 
that interest rates were higher because of uncertainty.  
 
3) Empirical Results 
We use quarterly data for 1983Q1-2003Q4.  The sample corresponds to the 
chairmanships of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan, but excludes the period 
when the Federal Reserve targeted non-borrowed reserves, rather than interest 
rates5.  We use the Effective Federal Funds rate as the nominal interest rate, 
inflation is the annual proportional change in the consumer price index and the 
output gap is the difference between the logarithm of GDP and the logarithm of 
                                                 
5 Rudebusch (1998) points out that it is hard to estimate a stable US policy rule for the whole 
postwar period. 
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the Congressional Budget Office measure of potential GDP.  Preliminary unit root 
analysis (the results are not reported but are available on request) showed that 
the output gap is stationary whereas the order of integration of the interest rate 
and inflation is more ambiguous; we assume that all variables are stationary (see 
also Dolado et al, 2004 and Clarida et al, 2000, for a discussion of similar 
issues).    
Estimates of the simple Taylor rule model of monetary policy in (7) are 
presented in column (i) of Table 2.  We find that the data prefer a specification in 
which interest rates respond to the expected values of inflation and the output 
gap one quarter ahead and in which use two lags of the interest rate are used to 
capture the persistence effect. We treat inflation and the output gap as 
endogenous, replacing expected future variables with actual values and then 
estimate by GMM using lagged variables as instruments.  We estimate that the 
weight on inflation is 1.58, that on output is 0.84 and the persistence parameter is 
0.96.   These estimates, which are comparable to other results in the literature 
(eg Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, Clarida et al, 2000, Dolado et al, 2004, 
Castelnuovo, 2003), satisfy the Taylor principle that excessive inflation should 
trigger increases in the real interest rate.  They also indicate a moderately 
relatively strong response to the output gap (although this effect is insignificant) 
and show considerable interest rate smoothing.   However, as Table 1b shows, 
the estimates fail the parameter stability test. 
We estimated the system comprising equations (1), (8) and (9) for various 
configurations of the model, considering a range of values for j, k, p and q.  Our 
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preferred model has a contemporaneous response of the output gap to the real 
interest rate (k = 0) and includes two lags of the output gap in (9), whereas 
inflation responds to the current output gap (j = 0) in (1) and interest rates 
respond to the expected inflation and output gaps one quarter ahead (p = q = 1), 
so the preferred specification of the interest rates equation in our system is the 
same as that of the simple Taylor rule6. Since the conditional variance for 
inflation and output are generated regressors (see e.g. Pagan, 1984 and Pagan 
and Ullah, 1988), the estimated variances from equations (1) and (9) may be 
biased and inconsistent measures of the true level of uncertainty if these 
equations are misspecified.  To check this, we follow Pagan and Ullah (1988) in 
testing the squared residuals of the estimated GARCH models for neglected 
serial correlation of up to order 4.  
Column (ii) of Table 1a presents estimates of the system comprising equations 
(1), (8) and (9), while Table 1b presents measures of goodness of fit and 
misspecification tests.  The estimates of equations (1) and (9) seem sensible.  
The tests presented in Table 1b do not indicate misspecification, suggesting that 
we may have adequate measures of the conditional heteroscedasticity of inflation 
and the output gap. The variances of inflation and the output gap implied by the 
estimates in column (ii) are presented in figure 1.  
Our measures of uncertainty, presented in figure 1 seem plausible.  
Inflation uncertainty is greatest in the early part of the sample, following the 
change in Fed Chair in 1987, in the early 1990s and after the third quarter of 
                                                 
6 Estimates of these alternative models are similar to those reported in Table 1, except for the 
case of a purely backward-looking Taylor rule (p = q = -1) where the inflation effect was negative.  
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2001.  Output gap uncertainty declines throughout the 1980s with resurgences in 
the early 1990s and after late 1999.  The low levels of uncertainty shown in figure 
1 in the 1990s reflects the unusual stability of output and inflation in that period 
that has been noted by, among others, Mankiw (2001). 
 Estimates of our proposed model of monetary policy under uncertainty in 
(8) (as part of the system also involving equations (1) and (9)) are presented in 
column (ii) of Table 2.  The inclusion of uncertainty effects improves the fit of the 
interest rate equation model and the estimates of this equation now pass the 
parameter stability test.  The effects of uncertainty are statistically well-
determined. We find that 0ππρ <  and 0yyρ < , indicating that monetary policy is 
less responsive to inflation and the output gap when these are more uncertain.  
We also find that 0yπρ >  and 0yπρ > , showing that monetary policy is more 
responsive to one variable when the other is more uncertain.  These estimates 
are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature, suggesting that the 
behavior of policymakers in the face of uncertainty is conforms to these 
requirements for optimal monetary policy.  
We illustrate the impact of uncertainty on interest rates in figure 2, where 
we plot Ctt ii −ˆ , the gap between the fitted and counterfactual interest rates, with 
estimated confidence intervals of +/- two standard errors7.  There are three 
periods in which uncertainty had a significant effect on interest rates: early-
mid1983, when uncertainty increased interest rates by 100-140 basis points, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Full details of these and other unreported estimates are available from the authors. 
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1989Q3-1990Q4 when uncertainty increased interest rates by up to 50 basis 
points and 1996Q1-2001Q1 when uncertainty reduced interest rates by up to 50 
basis points over five years.  
These are plausible findings. The large effect in 1983 reflects uncertainty 
about the effects of the switch to the interest rate as the policy instrument and 
may also reflect continuing uncertainty about change in policy instituted by Paul 
Volcker a few years earlier; the effect of the early 1990s may reflect the 
recession of 1990-1, while the sustained effect of the late 1990s reflects the 
debate about whether the increase in output over the 1990s reflected a rapid 
increase in the underlying equilibrium level of output (e.g. Gordon, 1997).   We 
can calculate the relative contributions of inflation and output gap uncertainty to 
the gap between the fitted and counterfactual interest rates using  
 
(11) 2 21 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ){[ ] [ ] }
π ππ π πρ ρ π ρ σ ρ π ρ σ+ + + +− = − + + +c y yt t i t t y t t t t t y t t yti i E E y E E y  
 
Figure 3 depicts the contributions of inflation and output gap uncertainty to the 
gap between the fitted and counterfactual interest rates, constructed using the 
decomposition in (11).  The gap is more closely correlated with the output gap 
effect, suggesting that the impact of uncertainty on interest rates is largely driven 
by output gap uncertainty, which generally outweighs the effect of inflation 
uncertainty.   This is consistent with the comments of policymakers, whose focus 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Recursive GMM is used to derive recursive estimates and standard errors of the parameters in 
(8) which are then used to construct Ctt ii −ˆ  +/- two standard errors. 
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is usually on output uncertainty (e.g. Meyer, 1999, Greenspan, 2003, and Yellen, 
2003). 
Our model assumes that the only effect of uncertainty on monetary policy 
rules is on the response of the interest rate to inflation and the output gap.  We 
also estimated alternative models of the impact of uncertainty on monetary policy 
rules.  In particular, we added inflation and output gap uncertainty directly to the 
model in (8), producing a composite model that encompasses both our model 
and that of Dolado et al (2004)8.  The direct effects of inflation and output gap 
uncertainty were insignificant suggesting that uncertainty only affects monetary 
policy by changing the response of interest rates to inflation and the output gap9.   
 We also considered models in which uncertainty affects the degree of 
interest rate smoothing10.  This was not successful.  We also considered an 
alternative model in which interest rates are affected by asset price disequilibria, 
measured by the lag of the log(dividend-price ratio) based on the S&P composite 
stock price index.  As an alternative measure of asset prices, we also considered 
whether interest rates are affected by the growth of the S&P index (following 
                                                 
8 The model estimated was  { }221110 )1()( yttttyttttitit yyEEiLi σρσρρπρρρρ σπσπ π +++−++= ++− ; this model simplifies to 
the model in Dolado et al (2004) if 0y yy y
π ππ πρ ρ ρ ρ= = = = . 
9 We could not reject the restrictions 0πσρ =  and 0yσρ =  but could reject the restrictions 
0y yy y
π ππ πρ ρ ρ ρ= = = = . 
10 The model estimated was { }1110 )1()( ++− +−++= ttyttttittitt yEEiLi ρπρρρρ π , where 
1
1 2 int( ) ...
n
it i t i tL L Lρ ρ ρ ρ −= + + +  and 22 ytyijtijijijt σρσρρρ ππ ++= , j=1,…,n. If policymakers 
adjust interest rates less frequently when uncertainty is greater (eg, Goodhart, 1999) then 
0ij
πρ >  and 0yijρ > . 
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Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001). Consistent with Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999), we failed to find any effect. 
We performed a number of robustness checks.  We estimated our system 
using two alternative volatility measures, (i) derived from recursive estimates of 
our GARCH systems and (ii) measured as a four quarter backward-looking 
moving average of the measures derived from the estimates of Table 1.  We also 
used alternative measures of the output gap, obtained by (i) applying the Kalman 
Filter to our measure of the output gap, regressing the log of output on its lag and 
the unobserved state variable, assuming that the latter follows a random walk, (ii) 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filtered level of output as a measure of potential 
output and (iii) using real-time output data from the database maintained by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  A measure of the real-time output gap 
was constructed by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the real-time output to 
obtain a measure of potential real-time output.  We also estimated our system 
using a measure of the average real interest rate, constructed as the difference 
between a four quarter moving average of the nominal interest rate and a four 
quarter moving average of the inflation rate (see Rudebusch, 2001).  Table 2 
summarises the average weights on inflation and the output gap implied by these 
estimates and the correlations between the implied values of tπρ  and ytρ  and 
those implied by the estimates of (8).  In most cases, the average weights on 
inflation and the output gap are similar to those in Table 1, with correspondingly 
high correlations.  
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4) Conclusions 
This paper has argued that the effects of uncertainty about the true state of the 
economy can be analyzed using a simple 3-equation system that captures the 
main features of the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in this case.  
The system features a monetary policy rule that extends the familiar Taylor rule 
representation of monetary policy by allowing the weights on inflation and the 
output gap to depend on the variances of inflation and the output gap, these 
latter being derived from GARCH models.   Estimating our model using data 
since the early 1980s, we have found that the actions of policymakers are 
consistent with the principles of optimal policy in that they respond less 
vigorously to inflation and the output gap when these are less certain. They also 
respond more strongly to one variable when the other is more uncertain. 
We have used our model to calculate the counterfactual interest rate that 
our estimates suggest would have been observed if there had been no 
uncertainty.  Using this, we found that uncertainty has a marked impact on 
monetary policy in three periods.  We find that uncertainty increased interest 
rates following the switch to the interest rate as the tool of policy in the early 
1980s and during the recession of the early 1990s, but that uncertainty reduced 
interest rates during the long expansion of the mid- late 1990s, when debate 
concerned the sustainability of high output growth.   
Our findings suggest that the effects of uncertainty can be detected using 
simple empirical models of monetary policy rules.  Our work can be extended in 
several ways.  We might embed on analysis of monetary policy in a more 
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sophisticated structural model in order to estimate the parameters of a structural 
model of optimal monetary policy.  We might estimate our model over different 
time periods in order to identify occasions when the behavior of policymakers 
was not consistent with the predictions of models of optimal monetary policy.  We 
might estimate our model using data for different countries in order to investigate 
the impact of different monetary policy regimes on the response to uncertainty.  
We intend to address these issues in future work.  
 
 19
Table 1 
Model estimates using GMM. Sample: 1983Q1-2003Q4 
 
Interest rate equation:  { }0 1 1 1( ) (1 )t i t i t t t yt t ti L i E E yπρ ρ ρ ρ π ρ− + += + + − + ,  where 
22
yt
y
tt σρσρρρ ππππππ ++=    and   22 ytyytyyyt σρσρρρ ππ ++= . 
Output gap equation:  0 1 1 2 2t y y t t t ty r y yθ θ γ γ ξ− −= − + + + ,   2 2 20 1 1 2 1yt t ytσ φ φ ξ φ σ− −= + + . 
Inflation equation:  1t t t tyππ π θ υ−= + + ,   2 2 20 1 1 2 1t t tπ πσ ω ωυ ω σ− −= + + . 
 
a) parameter estimates  
 (i) (ii) 
Interest rate equation   
   
iρ    0.956 (0.032)   0.876 (0.015) 
πρ    1.584 (0.749)   1.074 (0.213) 
ππρ    -2.333 (0.452) 
yπρ     4.805 (0.387) 
yρ    0.836 (0.530)   1.429 (0.132) 
y
πρ     1.525 (0.267) 
y
yρ    -2.900 (0.394) 
   
Output gap equation   
   
0yθ     0.660 (0.019) 
yθ    -0.021 (0.003) 
1γ     1.256 (0.019) 
2γ    -0.354 (0.017) 
0φ      0.114 (0.040) 
1φ      0.150 (0.071) 
2φ      0.836 (0.046) 
Inflation equation   
   
πθ     0.012 (0.005) 
0ω     0.057 (0.022) 
1ω     0.625 (0.174) 
2ω      0.289 (0.140) 
   
Notes: Column (i) reports the parameter estimates of equation (7) in 
main text. Column (ii) report the parameter estimates of the system 
involving equations (1), (8) and (9) in main text. Numbers in 
parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. 
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b) Goodness of fit and diagnostics 
 (i) (ii) 
Interest rate equation   
   
Average inflation effect   1.584   2.312 
Average output gap effect   0.836   0.720 
Adjust. R2   0.961   0.964 
s.e. of regression   0.471   0.451 
J stat 11.00 [0.81] 17.99 [0.12] 
Parameter stability   2.11 [0.03]   0.15 [0.97] 
   
Output gap equation   
   
Adjust. R2    0.943 
s.e. of regression    0.493 
Parameter stability    0.14 [0.93] 
Neglected ARCH    0.50 [0.73] 
   
Inflation equation   
   
Adjust. R2    0.782 
s.e. of regression    0.495 
Parameter stability    1.62 [0.20] 
Neglected ARCH    0.68 [0.60] 
Notes: For column (i), J stat is a chi-square test of the model’s 
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). For column (ii), J stat is a chi-
square test of the system’s overidentifying restrictions. The instruments 
are a constant, one lag of 2ytσ and 2tπσ  and six lags of the interest rate, 
inflation and the output gap. Parameter stability is an F test of parameter 
stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994, and Eitrheim and Teräsvirta, 
1996). Neglected ARCH is the Lagrange Multiplier F test on the squared 
residuals for remaining serial correlation of order 4. Numbers in square 
brackets are the probability values of the test statistics. 
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Table 2 
Estimates based on alternatives measures 
 Recursive 
estimates 
4-quarter 
MA 
estimates 
Kalman 
Filter 
estimates 
Hodrick-
Prescott 
Filter 
estimates 
Real-time 
output 
estimates 
Average 
real interest 
rate 
estimates 
Average 
inflation effect 
 2.326  1.849  1.300  1.232  1.452  1.836 
Correlation 1  0.715  0.473  0.814  0.956  0.556  0.962 
       
Average output 
gap effect 
 0.953  0.273  0.681  1.809  1.938  0.958 
Correlation 2  0.708  0.561  0.959  0.868  0.554  0.635 
Notes:  
1 Correlation between the implied values of 22 yt
y
tt σρσρρρ ππππππ ++=  and that implied by the 
estimate of Table 1 column (ii). 
2 Correlation between the implied values of 22 yt
y
ytyyyt σρσρρρ ππ ++=  and that implied by the 
estimate of Table 1 column (ii). 
3 The average real interest rate is the difference between ti  and tπ , where ti  and tπ  are the 
four quarter moving averages of the nominal interest and inflation rates respectively.  
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Figure 1 
The implied variance of inflation and the output gap 
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Figure 2 
The gap between fitted and counterfactual interest rates  
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Figure 3 
The contributions of inflation and output gap uncertainty to the gap 
between fitted and counterfactual interest rates  
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